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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the 'tragedy of the commons' model as 
examined by Garrett Hardin, and analyses the theoretical responses to the 
'tragedy'. These responses are then examined in the practical context of 
New Zealand fisheries management. 
The paper argues that none of Hardin's theoretical reposes work in their 
pure form. Consequently, this paper assumes that a combination of the 
three responses, (private property rights, government regulation and 
internal stakeholder control) is necessary to effectively deal with the 
'tragedy of the commons' . 
The paper looks at the objectives of New Zealand fisheries 
management in order to conclude whether the combination of 'tragedy' 
responses used in New Zealand; 
(a) deals effectively with the 'tragedy of the commons'; 
(b) achieves the statutory objectives set. 
New .Zealand fisheries man.fig~ment is presently in a state of change so this 
paper seeks to make comparisons between the curr.ent sys,'tem and the 
newly introduced amendments. The paper a!S() makes ·"'Sl{ggestions of 
further reform. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents--J}age, footrn;,~s, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately fJ,. 463 word~. 
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Picture a stretch of sea open to all. It is to be expected that each fisher will try 
to take as many fish as possible from the beds. Such an arrangement may work 
satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching and disease keep the 
numbers of people below, and fish above the carrying capacity of the beds. 
Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning. At this point the inherent logic 
of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being each fisher seeks to maximise his or her gain. She asks, 
"What is the utility to me of catching one more fish?" Since the fisher receives 
all the profits from the sale of the fish the positive utility is nearly + 1. The 
negative component is the effect of taking one more fish from the ocean. Since 
the negative component is shared by all the fishers, the negative utility for any 
particular fisher is only a fraction of -1. 
Therefore, the rational fisher concludes that the only sensible course of action is 
lo lake anolher fish from lhe sea. And anolher, and anolher .... This is the 
conclusion reached by every fisher sharing the fishing beds. Therein is the 
tragedy. Each person is locked into a system that compels them to catch fish 
without limit - in a world that is limited. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
a11_ l 
I I1VTRODUCTION 
Ganett Hardin's 1968 aiiicle "The Tragedy of the 
Commons" describes the way in which sustainability is precluded in 
relation to a common field of cattle. Since the publication of his 
article, the "tragedy metaphor"2 has been used to describe the problems 
of a 'commons' or open access situation in relation to a vaiiety of natural 
resources, including fisheries and national parks. The problem of open-
access :fishe1ies fits well into the 'tragedy' model. 
This paper looks at the 'tragedy of the commons' model as 
examined by Garrett Hardin, and analyses the theoretical responses to the 
'tragedy'. These responses are then examined in the practical context of 
New Zealand fisheries management. 
The paper argues that none of Hardin's theoretical reposes work in 
their pure fom1 . Consequently, this paper assumes that a combination of 
the three responses, (private property rights, government regulation and 
1 Garrett Hardin "The Tragedy of the Conunons" (1968) 162 Science 1242,1244. 
2 David Hawkey Property Rights, JTQs and the Slice of the Fish Pie: An Appraisal of 
Fisl1e1y Culture and Conflict in the North/and Region (Policy Discussion Paper, 
Department of Economics, Auckland, 1994) 5. 
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internal stakeholder control) 1s necessary to effectively deal with the 
'tragedy of the commons' . 
The paper looks at the objectives of New Zealand fishe1ies 
management in order to conclude whether the combination of 'tragedy' 
responses used in New Zealand; 
(a) deals effectively with the 'tragedy of the commons'; 
(b) achieves the statutory objectives set. 
New Zealand fisheries management is presently in a state of change so this 
paper seeks to make compaiisons between the cun-ent system and the 
newiy introduced amendments. The paper also makes suggestions of 
further reform. 
New Zealand was chosen as an appropriate state in which to look at 
the practical implications of Hardin's 'tragedy' because the New Zealand 
fishe1ies management system incorporates components from all three 
'tragedy' responses. This paper is restricted to the consideration of fin 
fishe1ies as opposed to more sedentary species such as scallops and lobster 
because the issues to be addressed differ between the two groups. 
II 'FREEDOM OF THE SEAS' AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'TRAGEDY' 
A The Development of the 'Freedom of the Seas' Doctrine 
The freedom to fish the high seas at will has been a feature of 
international law since the 1600's. In 1609, Dutch jmist Hugo Grotius 
formulated the doctrine of the 'freedom of the seas' and published his 
argument in the book A1are Libernm.3 The doctrine argued that property 
could only exist in the seas if they were able to be occupied and defended 
against others. 4 On the assumption that such occupation or defence 
capacity was impossible at the time, Grotius argued that the seas belonged 
to no one. His idea was attractive to the English because at the time the 
3 RP Anand Origin and Devlopment of the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff. The 
Hague, 1982) 2. 
A 
"T Peter H Pearse "Developing Property Rights as Instruments of Natural Resources 
Policy: the Case of the Fisheries" Climate Change: Designing a Tradeable Permit 
System (OECD Publications Service, France, 1992) 109, 111. 
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Pope was intent on dividing the world's oceans between Spain and 
Po1tugal. England did not want to see its maritime powers crniailed and it 
therefore embraced the 'freedom' doctrine. 5 
The doctrine of "freedom of the seas" was not adopted as the 
general stance of international law until the end of the Napoleonic wars. 
The need for freedom of navigation in order to promote trade Jinks and the 
increasing colonial empires slowly halted the fight for exclusive 1ights to 
certain areas of open sea. The doctrine of the "freedom of the seas" 
became the prevailing international law rule.6 
For the past two hundred years the common law right allowing 
every person to fish the sea in an unrestricted manner has remained the 
general rnle. This practice worked satisfactorily and remained sustainable 
for so long due to external factors. These factors were not identical to 
those used in the original 'tragedy model',7 but were more technologically 
and sociologically based. Lack of technological advances such as 
refrigerated containers, onboard factory processing facilities and 'fish 
finders' meant that fewer fish could be caught at any one time. Prior to the 
invention of freezers and supermarkets, any :fish caught had to be either 
processed or sold relatively quickly. 
When these technological advances developed at the beginning of 
this century, the fishing indust1y changed from a relatively small domestic 
industry to a large scale, multi-national enterprise. As seafood products 
became a popular exp01i conunodity, the myth that fish stocks were 
inexhaustible began to erode. Thus the 'tragedy of the open-access fishery' 
unfolded. 
B Conservation and Economics - Two Types of Tragedy 
The fishing practices of the twentieth centmy have resulted in t'.vo 
general types of 'tragedy' occurring. Peter Pearse, in his article on the 
development of prope1iy rights in natural resources, considered that both a 
5 Peter H Pearse above n 4, 111. 
6 RP Anand above n 3, 129. 
7 l11e original factors discussed by Hardin were tribal wars, poaching and disease. 
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"conservation tragedy" and an "economic tragedy" commonly result from a 
policy of open access fishing. 8 
l The Conservation Tragedy 
The "conservation tragedy" occurs largely because, due to increases 
in technology, new fish stocks and fish species are being constantly 
discovered and exploited. Fishers want to catch the most fish for the least 
effort, so consequently beds with an abundance of high quality fish are 
quickly depleted. Under an open access system fishers also want to catch 
more fish than their competitors. This means that boats are constantly in 
use in order for the fisher to keep ahead in a competitive market. 
If the fishe1y looks profitable more potential fishers are drawn into 
the industry. They contribute to the tragedy by catching even more fish, 
thus fi.uiher depleting the stocks. This pendulum between the abundance 
which occurs whenever new technology proves effective or new stocks and 
species are found, and depletion when the stocks are overfished, has 
resulted in a situation where resources and product demand fluctuate 
wildly.9 
The pressure on fish stocks, not only in New Zealand, but around 
the world has continued to increase. In 1995, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation found that 70 per cent of the world's fishstocks 
are now either fully exploited, over-fished, depleted or are rebuilding from 
previous over-fishing_ lo 
ii The Economic Tragedy 
Pearse also analysed the economic tragedy which usually 
accompanies stock depletion. Under a policy of open-access fisheries, a 
rational, self interested fisher will try to catch as many fish as possible and 
will expand the fleet or invest in new technology to do so. In the 
competitive atmosphere of an open access fishery, there is not only a race 
8 Peter H Pearse above n 4, 112. 
9 Peter H Pearse above n 4, 112. 
10 The State of World Fisheries and A quaculture (UN Food and Agricultural 
Organisation, Rome, i995). 
for fish, but a race for technology also. This continues even when there are 
enough boats and enough equipment to catch all the available product. 
The result is larger and better equipped fishing fleets competing with each 
other to catch the largest share of a limited stock population. 
As a result of this race for fish, an economic problem of over 
expansion and inefficiency is created in the industry. A profitable fishery 
will attract newcomers keen to make some fast money. The resulting 
expansion in labour and capital will cause other fishers to increase their 
efforts in order to maintain their catch levels. The increased pressure on 
the fishery will result in increased effort for fewer profits. In times of 
depletion, fishers wanting to exit the indust1y will find it hard to sell their 
businesses and equipment. The eventual result is an industry that has 
overexpanded in terms of both capital and Jabour, consequentially reducing 
the profits for each fisher involved. 
III THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
'TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS' 
How then do we solve the twin tragedies of open-access fisheries? 
Garrett Hardin, in the original 'tragedy' model, raised three different 
suggestions as possibilities for solving the 'tragedy' in the context of 
population growth, these being: 
(a) p1ivatisation of the resource; 
(b) government regulation; 
( c) internal controls by stakeholders. 
Of these three possible solutions Hardin prefers "social arrangements that 
create responsibility" l l or "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" 12 in the 
context of population growth. However, his article suggests that the other 
two 'solutions' have a place in resolving problems stemming from other 
open access or open usage practices, such as overuse of national parks or 
pollution. 
Hardin says of the fisheries tragedy, "the oceans of the world 
continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the conm1ons. 
11 Garrett Hardin above n 1, 1247. 
12 Garrett Hardin above n 1, 1247. 
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Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the 
'freedom of the seas"'. 13 Is any one of Hardin's three solutions, like the 
tragedy metaphor itself, able to be applied to the case of fisheries? 
This part of the paper examines the application of each of the three 
solutions, in their pure forms, to fisheries, and analyses whether the pure 
application of this theoretical model would work in practice. 
A Privatisation of the Resource -Property rights in 
Fisheries 
Adopting a pure private property regime as a solution to the 
problem of open-access fisheries would involve the creation of a property 
right in either the fish themselves or in a section of the sea or seabed. In 
theory, this would give each fisher an easily defined right which could be 
treated as that fisher wished. 
1 Advantages of a Private Property Regime in Fisheries 
The creation of a property right in fisheries would eliminate the 
'race for fish'. It would also provide fishers with the right to protect their 
assets if another fisher tried to steal them or endanger their sustainability. 
in theory, if each fisher was allocated certain rights then self interested 
fishers would conserve their fishery. By taking orJy a small amount of 
stock each year, fishers would ensure that they did not exhaust the 
resource, and that their asset retained or increased its value. 
A pure prope1ty rights system would result in the close of the 
comrnons and the resolution of many of the problems which accompany 
open access fishe1ies, however, in practice the solution in its pure form is 
unlikely to adequately resolve the 'tragedy'. 
2 Disadvantages of a Pure Property Rights Regime in Fisheries 
Under a property rights regime, the time may come when a self-
interested fisher also finds that it is uneconomical to conserve part of his or 
her catch with the aim of ensuring future sustainability. The political 
circumstances or world markets may be so unce1tain that a fisher decides 
that he or she is better to fish the species to commercial extinction14 in the 
13 Garrett Hardin above n 1, 1245. 
14 Commerical exiinction occurs when the effort necessary to catch the fish stock is 
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present market than to wait for possible legislative changes to the property 
right or a possible downturn in world fish prices. The fisher may choose to 
take certain money today rather than risking the financial worth of the asset 
tomorrow. This incentive is increased when taking advantage of bank 
interest rates will prove to be a better investment than sustaining the fish 
stocks. 
In the context of the doctrine of the 'freedom of the seas', a private 
property right allowing some people to exclude others from the fisheries is 
alien. This issue is of particular importance to indigenous peoples. In 
many cultures the concept of the 'property right' is foreign, especially with 
regard to fisheries. Under a propet1y lights system the cultural concerns 
of indigenous peoples would have to be resolved. 
Recreational fishers may also have a problem with a property rights 
regime as such as system would inevitably restrict the 'freedom of the seas' 
doctrine. Many recreational fishers would not want to pay for the privilege 
of doing what they have always done. The concept of buying propet1y 
rights or allocating them based on a catch history model would also create 
problems for environmentalists. Under such an economically liberal regime 
environmentalists may have to buy property rights in the fisheries and then 
not use them in order to protect cet1ain species. This is difficult as many 
environmental organisations may not have the money to pay for 'non-use 
tights' conside1ing that they will not obtain any profit from not using the 
beds. 
An additional problem with the practicality of creating a well 
defined propet1y right in fish is the migratory quality of most fin fish . 
\Vhile a private property regime may be suitable for sedentary species, such 
as shellfish, or for freshwater species confined to ce11ain lakes, it is 
impractical for most fin fish. As an alternative, there have been proposals 
to allocate portions of the seabed to fishers under a propetiy rights regime, 
but this concept faces the same problem.15 Fishers would race to catch as 
many fish as possible when the stocks passed through their property. No 
conservation efforts would be made because fishers would be afraid of 
other tights holders benefiting from their effo11s. Technology may provide 
the answers by allowing us to genetically tag or track fish. However, not 
such that it is commerically unviabie to do so. 
15 David Hawkey above n 2, 8. 
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only is this impossible at present but it aiso raises the possibility of costly 
fish custody battles in the future. 
Therefore, while a pure property rights based fish management 
policy does solve the problem of the 'tragedy of the commons', it is 
impossible to achieve at present and may not provide suitable conservation 
measures. 
B Government Regulation 
This solution works on the theory that some sort of over riding 
authority is needed to curb fisher's self-interest, and to avoid the 'tragedy of 
the comn10ns' for the g, eater conununity good. In practice, this results i,, 
limitations being placed on fisheries through govenm1ent regulation or 
legislation. 
Govermnent regulation was the main method of fisheries control in 
New Zealand until 1986, and is still widely used in other states. 
Regulations conL'11on1y involve restrictions being placed on; the t'jpe of 
gear allowed to catch fish; the size of the fish; the fishing seasons; a,,d the 
fishing locations. In time this often develops into a licence or pennit 
system whereby a certain number of permits are given out either to vessels 
or individual fishers. 
1 Advantages of Fisheries lvfanagement by Government Regulation 
Licensing gives some exclusivity to the fishery. Damage to the 
commons is lim..ited by the number of people who have access to it. 
Government regulation also provides some accountability to the general 
public and other non-cmm11ercial stakeholders. If the L"ldustry is regulated 
by a central, publicly elected body, the general public are able to lobby for 
change or vote for the pmiy whose fisheries objectives most closely reflect 
their O\.vn. 
If all involved obey the regulations govern.mg fisheries then this 
system can be very effective. However, in practice the 'solution' of 
government regulation does not solve the problem of open access. It 
merely gives fewer people access to the commons. This brings a number of 
disadvantages. 
2 Disadvantages of Fisheries lvfanagemenf by Government 
Regulation 
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Government regulation in the form of licences alone will not work 
in practice, as the 'race for fish' will still exist amongst licence holders. The 
race for better technology will also continue to flourish resulting in the 
'economic tragedy' which characterises common access fisheries. 
Even when government regulation also puts constraints on the 
permitted technology, the system in its pure form still results in problems 
for the cormnercial fisher. Using government regulation as a solution to 
the 'tragedy of the commons' is problematic in cases where such regulations 
require lengthy processes of consultation and drafting. In this situation, it 
is often difficult for legislators and government officials to keep up with the 
pace of new technology. This results in a catch twenty-two situation for 
fishers. They cannot refuse to take advantage of the tedmology, because 
in doing so they will lose their comparative advantage, yet, if they do take 
advantage of the technology, it may soon become restricted by legislation 
and will have limited worth. Either way the fisher is economically 
disadvantaged. 
If government regulations are used to modi..~y the behaviour of 
fishers, it is essential that they have some sort of coercive element to them. 
Hawkey writes of a "fear of authority that will keep free-rider behaviour in 
check". 16 in practice, it is very hard to introduce this coercive eiement to 
ocean fisheries. To begin with, government monitoring authorities are 
limited by incomplete scientific information on fish populations and 
locations. Secondly, the size of fishing zones is ovenvhelming compared to 
the resources available to be spent and the enforcement capabilities of the 
government. This is especially true of small island states like New Zealand. 
Governments are forced to use further regulation to make enforcement 
easier including compulsory paper trails, and the registration of commercial 
fish seiiers. 
Under a system characterised by central government reg..1lation, it is 
very hard to successfully solve the problem of the 'tragedy of the commons' 
be""u"e c:si..e~" w·ho w"n ...... o --he" .... he S.Y"' ... em .,-A are ... :i1:~-~ t" ma1' e va .) 11 U J.) a1 L L \.., J aL L 1 .)L 1 J a11u VV U Hli5 V U 1'. 
eff01is to disguise their actions are difficult to catch. Effective 
government regulation and monitoring of ocean fisheries is a very 
expensive option. 
l6 David Hawkey above n 2, 9. 
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C Internal Stakeholder Controls 
This was Hardin's preferred response to the 'tragedy of the 
conunons' in relation to population control - "mutual coercio~ mutually 
agreed to" or "social arrangements that produce responsibiiity" 17 Hawkey 
looks at the issue of internal controls in relation to fisheries. He sees it as a 
situation where outcomes to other group members, or to the group as a 
whole are considered by individual group members to be their concern. 18 
1 Advantages of Managing Fisheries Through Internal Controls 
Following from Hawkey's theory, if fishers developed a group 
identity whereby, the actions of each member concerned the group as a 
whole, then the group would act to prevent individuals jeopardising the 
future sustai11ability of the resource. The govermnent could then leave the 
fishing industry to be controlled from within. This option would result in 
the taxpayer incurring few ongoing costs and would allow the fishery to 
operate in a commercially effective mam1.er. 
2 1J1e Disadvantages of }.1anaging Fisheries Through Internal 
Comrols 
The problems of allowing fisheries to be controlled on a purely 
internal basis arise when the intrinsic vaiuel9 of fisheries is considered. If 
control of the industry was i..'1.ternalised, then the accountability which 
exists under govermnent regulation would be lost. Complete internal 
control assumes that the orJy people which have an interest in commercial 
fisheries are those who are involved in the industry itself This leaves out 
environmentalists, those concerned v.1.th the well-being of sea mammals 
and birds, and the general public. Leaving some control of fisheries with an 
oveITiding body such as central or local governments gives the true owners 
of the resource, the general public, a forum to voice complaints ai.,d to 
lobby for changes. 
17 Garrett Harqin above p L 124 7. 
18 David Hawkey above n 2,10. 
19 The intrinsic value of fisheries looks at their inherent value rather than their value to 
the hu.,.91.1an population as food er in science. It accepts t.11at fisheries and L11eir 
sunomiCling ecosystems are valuable in their ow11 right. 
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In theory, a controlling group including representatives of all 
interests could solve the problems of isolating conservationists, scientists, 
and the general public. However, such a group is unlikely to be able to 
reach agreement on any major decisions relating to fisheries management. 
The lack of a group consensus would weaken the concept of 'group 
identity' and consequently could make voluntary compliance with group 
decisions less likely. 
The size of the controlling body is also a problem which stands in 
the way of a communal solution to the 'tragedy'. The greater the size of the 
controlling body, the greater the likelihood of conflict within the group and 
of dissenting break-off groups. Such a body is only as good as its internal 
culture. If an internal control group grows in size, members may not feel 
that their opinions are adequately represented. Feelings of alienation or a 
lack of consensus among group members could result in a breakdown of 
internal cohesion. 
The scope of the authority of a controlling group would also have 
to be accurately defined. There would need to be clear procedures to deal 
with those who break group policies or rules, and punislunent options to 
deal with serious breaches. The group would need the authority to 
in1pound propert'y aJ1d re1nove tl1e rigl1t to fish fron1 those 1,~vho consistently 
chose to break the rules. In tum this would create the need for a court-like 
investigation capability and a forum for disputes between members. 
Finally, the 'tragedy' solution of control from within lacks the 
distance and bias which a disinterested regulator would provide. This 
criticism has also been levelled at centralised govermnent regulation of the 
.fishing industry. 20 Although those involved in the industry are able to have 
the best access to hands on information, it is also difficult for them to be 
objective about industry issues and to take other interests (such as those of 
conservationists) into accou11t. 
D Conclusion 
The three responses to the 'tragedy of the corrunons' outlined in 
Ga.nett Hardin's a11icle represent theoretical solutions to a model problem. 
It is urtlikely that any of these solutions alone and in their pure for1n vvould 
vvork in practice. It then beco1nes a question of how to n1ix the solutions. 
20 David Hawkey above n 2, 11. 
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Which combination of the three responses should be used to enable the 
theo1y to work in practice? 
The combination of responses to the 'tragedy' model could vaiy 
extensively. The mix of solutions will differ depending on many things, 
including: 
(a) the type of 'commons' being dealt with; 
(b) whether the problem is connected to a commercial activity; 
( c) whether the problem is able to be contained within state 
boundaries; and 
( d) the political climate of the controlling body. 
IV THE 'NEW ZEALAND SOLUTION' - QMS 
The following part of this paper looks at the way that the 'tragedy 
of the commons' has been dealt with in New Zealand fisheries since the 
introduction of the Quota Management System (QMS). After examining 
the current law and its objectives, the paper will analyse the criticisms of 
the New Zealand system which gave rise to the 1998 Independent Review 
of the Fisheries Act 1996 and the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999. 
A The Background to QMS 
Prior to the implementation of the QMS, New Zealand fisheries 
were controlled by an almost purely regulato1y scheme. Up until the 
1960's the New Zealand fishing industry was relatively small. The 12 mile 
tenitorial sea limit and the lack of foreign fishing vessels in New Zealand 
seas were both factors in limiting the size of the industry.21 From the mid-
1960's foreign vessels were encouraged to fish within New Zealand waters, 
but the area outside the territorial sea was still not exploited by the New 
Zealand industry. 22 
During the 1970's pressure began to increase on fishstocks and 
some popular New Zealand inshore species such as snapper and gurnard 
became severely depleted. In 1978, the system of Exclusive Economic 
') 1 . . -
.,_ lan Smith and Rowan Taylor (eds.) 'J'he State ofivew Zealand's Hnvironment 
(Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1997) 9. 96. 
'>? . ,.,_ Smith and Taylor above n 21 , 97. 
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Zones (EEZs) was established, giving New Zealand exclusive control of 
the area within 200 nautical miles of the coastline. This resuited in New 
Zealand having the fourth largest EEZ in the world. With New Zealand's 
small population, this provided not only a great opp01tunity for the fishing 
industry, but also an overwhelming responsibility as far as enforcement 
measures were concerned. 
After the New Zealand EEZ was established, exploitation of deep 
water species such as orange roughy and hoki became more common. 
However, the government, realising that inshore fisheries were becoming 
increasingly depleted, was placing greater and greater restrictions on the 
over-capitalised fishing industry. 23 Both the conservation and economic 
tragedies described by Pearse were being realised in New Zealand. From 
the early 1980's it became clear that the regulatory approach in its present 
form was not working effectively. Either the type of regulation would have 
to be substantially changed, or an alternative solution to government 
inter1ention would have to be found . 
B How does Ql'JS work? 
The Quota Management System was introduced in 1983 for deep 
water fisheries and in 1986 for inshore fisheries. At first orJy a small 
number of fish stocks were part of the system, but this has been gradually 
increased with the aiin of enco111passing all co11uTiercia1Iy fisl1ed species into 
the QMS. 
The system works by dividing New Zealand's EEZ into ten Quota 
Management Areas (Q:tv1As). \Vithin each area, every fishstock governed 
U·1d""r i-l,.o Qll.lf(;c ; ., ..... ;""'" a "an·e .i.-:o ...... ~,,....,p1"' Cl\TAl 1S11apper ;., ('\,.,.,. .. ., 1 \,.., LJ.l\., l'\i.1.i,J hJ fSl y \.,J.1 11 J.J. , 1. 1 \o.,I\.UJ.11 .l\.,' l,Jl.. "1 J. \ J. 111 "-<'.UVLU 
Ma.'1agement Area One), or BNS2 (Bluenose in Quota Management Area 
Two). Every year the :tvlinister of Fisheries calculates a Total Allowable 
r'atAh ('T'AC\ +~1· enA}, f':shs•oAlr ;n oncl1 n1·on 'l'l,;s Aalculnt;on 1·s l,n~erl "'" v v11. ..1.. / 1.v av 1 1.1 1 L v.n. 1 \..,Q 1 a \.,a. ..1 tll v 1 1a 1 1 ua.:, u vu 
advice from departmental staff and NTwA researchers24. The TAC may be 
increased or reduced each year as a result of the 11inister's decision. The 
Minister has a checklist of several things which must be taken into account 
23 Smith and Tavior above n 21, 99. 
24 Much of ihe research work undertaken by the Ministry of Fisheries has been 
contracted out to 1\TJ\l/.cA,. (J'Jational Institute of \Yater a..11d .cA,.tn1ospheric Research 
Limited). 
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when he or she makes a TAC decision. This includes the purpose section 
and sections 11 to 14 of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
Foilowing the setting of the TAC, allowances are made for 
recreational fishing, Maori customary fishing and illegal fishing. After 
these figures have been taken into account the remainder of the TAC forms 
the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (T ACC). The TACC is then 
separated between the com1nercial fishers who hold the quota for that 
fishstock in that area. These separated a..Tiounts are caUed Individual 
T fi , , n ,T~,.,. \ 'TI-. n£ · d. · A 1 ~ 1-. fi 1-. • rans erame ~uota ~11\..._JS; . .1.uey CO, er on an lD iVluUa, uSuer Or S,ung 
co1npa..,y, the right to catch a specified ton.,age of a ce1tain species of fish, 
from a certain area, in one fishing year. Fishers caught fishing without 
quota or fishing above their quota limits are pu.'1.ished. 
Originally the ITQ for each fisher was fixed and allocated in 
perpetuity. This meant that, where the sum of the ITQs exceeded the 
T ACC, the goverr"Tient would buy back the surplus. However, this proved 
too costly. Conseque11tly, i11 the Fislieries A~e11d1nent Act 1990, the ITQ 
system was changed to form a percentage amount. This was intended to 
reflect the amount of quota each fisher held in relation to others in that 
species and area. Under tl1e Fisheries Alnendment Act 1990, tl1e 
governrnent v,as able to reduce or increase the T ACC vvithout having to 
worry about expensive buyback prov1s1ons and witl1out having to 
compensate fishers for the loss resulting from T ACC reductions (if the 
T ACC was increased fishers would also get a 'bonus' increase in their quota 
amount at no cost). 
Originally quota was allocated on the basis of catch histories of 
fishers during specified years. Th.is created problems at the time because 
not every commercial fisher was eligible for quota. Some part-tin1e and 
infrequent fishers whose catch statistics were not high enough were not 
awarded quota. 
_flow does the 
Commons' Solutions? 
Q},,f S fit into 
l 
~ Property 1?.igf;ts Aspects 
the ,rr ... ~a,.,-1 .. -1,ubc:::uy of the 
The Q1v1S systern cor..fers a type of propeity right on holders of 
individual quotas. The rights were allocated by the government and given 
to fishers. Th.is represe11ts a coi1trast to tl1e way in wllich other ~natttral 
resources have been privatised. For example, broadcasting rights to 
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airwaves were opened to tender rather than being given away based on the 
previous use histories of the resource users. 
In theory, a system of defined property rights will prevent users 
from interfering with the production of others.25 Users will know how 
much fish they are entitled to catch, and open access to fisheries, with the 
problems that it brings will come to an end. 
The ITQs of New Zealand commercial fishers are able to be treated 
like most other prope1iy rights. They are able to be sold, bequeathed or 
used as security on a mortgage. The government runs a registry services 
which, like the Land Transfer Office, keeps a record of quota owners and 
amounts. 
However, it is essential to remember that the property rights 
conferred under the QMS are not pure property rights . The fishers do not 
'own' the fish until they are caught, nor do they own sections or portions of 
the sea or seabed. The rights which have been allocated under the QMS 
are essentially rights of 'withdrawal' as opposed to rights of 'access'. 
Fishers are entitled to 'withdraw' a certain amount of fish from certain 
areas. The right has a degree of exclusivity in that, only those holding 
quota are allowed to fish, for that species, in that area, in a commercial 
manner. However, recreational fishers and Maori customary fishers are 
sti11 able to fish for any species in any area, subject to statutory and 
conunon law controls. 
Another limit to the QMS property rights regime is that it confers 
only "operational" rights. David Hawkey examines the difference between 
"collective-choice" property rights and "operational" property rights.26 He 
sees "collective-choice" rights as those which allow paiiicipation in the 
making and enforcing of rights and rules. By contrast, "operational" rights 
allow only the use of the resource. At present, the propetiy rights 
conferred upon fishers in New Zealand are of the operational rights type. 
2 The Government Regulation Component 
This is where the solution of govermnent regulation enters the 
equation. The QMS is managed by the iv1inistry of Fisheries and is 
25 Peter H Pearse above n 4, llO. 
26 David Hawkey above n 2, 11 . 
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controlled by the Fisheries Act 1983, the Fisheries Act 1996, the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 and various other statutes 
and regulations. The :Ministry plays a large regulatory role under the QMS 
regime, from implementing the legislation to maintaining a registry of the 
transfer of ITQs. The Ministry is also responsible for setting the TAC and 
T ACC, and for obtaining the necessary research information to set these 
figures . 
To cover these and other industry related costs, the government 
began to collect a levy from the fishers and boat owners in 1994. This was 
called the 'cost recovery system'. Under this system, the industry 
reimburses the government for money spent on maintaining the commercial 
fishing industry. The 'cost recovery system' is run on an 'avoidable cost 
principle'. This means that the cost of any government expenditure which 
would not have been undertaken, but for the industry, is attributable to the 
industry. 
Under the present QMS there is a lot of discussion between the 
government and the commercial fishing industry as to the levies to be paid, 
the setting of the TAC and T ACC, the incorporation of the other species 
into the QMS and more recently, talks of the devolution of non-core 
functions under the Fisheries Act to the industry. 
3 The Industry Control Component 
This brings in the third of Hardin's responses to the 'tragedy of the 
commons'. The commercial fishing indu&iry in New Zealand is already 
fairly well organised into groups which represent the interests of 
commercial fishers. These include the New Zealand Seafood Industry 
Council Ltd (SeaFIC), Seafood Conso1tium Limited and the New Zealand 
Rock Lobster Industry Council. Some groups conduct their own research 
and others collectively lobby the government for changes to the QMS 
system. There are also a number of publications published by the industry 
to discuss current issues and keep fishers informed of new policies and 
regulations as well as the latest TAC and T ACC settings. 
At present the involvement of these organisations m fisheries 
management decision making is usually as a patty to government 
consultation or as a lobby group. Currently there are calls from the 
indust1y and some government officials to devolve ce1tain government 
provided functions into industry control. The argument in favour of this is 
that, if the industiy is paying the government levies under the cost recovery 
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programme, they should, have some reciprocal responsibility and control 
regarding the way that the money is spent. 
If the proposed devolution goes ahead it would result in greater 
emphasis being put on the third response to Hardin's 'tragedy' model, 
although property tights and government regulation would still play a part. 
4 Conclusion 
At present the New Zealand system of QMS is a mixture of all 
three of Hardin's solutions. The components work together in a system of 
limited propetty rights governed by a central lv1inistry, with a consultation 
and discussion relationship between the various parties. 
The present QMS in New Zealand can be diagrammed as follows: 
Private ership 
Industry ontrol 
This illustrates that the two biggest pa1ts of the system are government 
regulation and private property rights. At present the amount of control 
exercised by stakeholders is much more limited. 
V WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF 1VEW 
ZEALA1VD FISHERIES MA1VA GEJtlENT? 
The goal of solving the 'tragedy of the commons' is patt of a wider 
picture of ensuring the sustainability of the natural resource in question. 
The essence of the 'tragedy' is that it compels each person involved to 
exploit the resource without limit - in a world that is limited.27 This results 
in undennining the sustainability of the resource. Dealing with the problem 
of open access is a part of ensuring its sustainability, but there are also 
other considerations to be taken into account. 
This section of the paper exainines the objectives of New Zealand 
fisheries management under the Fisheries Act 1996. The paper then 
27 Garrett Hardin above n 1, 1244. 
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analyses whether the current combination of private property rights, 
government regulation and internal control achieves these aims. 
A Section 8 of the Fisheries Act 1996 
Section 8 of the Fisheries Act 1996 indicates that the purpose of 
that Act is to "provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while 
ensming sustainability" . The section goes on to indicate that 'ensming 
sustainability" means meeting the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations and avoiding, mitigating or remedying any damage to the 
aquatic environment. 28 
This purpose provision incorporates several ideas which are 
imp01tant to fishe1ies management in New Zealand. These ideas are; 
( 1) sustainability of stocks; 
(2) utilisation of the resource; and 
(3) protecting the aquatic environment.29 
B Sustainability of Stocks 
This represents the 'environmental bottomline' in New Zealand 
fishe1ies management. Without sustainability as a ptimary objective, the 
other two goals of fisheries management have no anchors or limits. The 
sustainability objective ensures that fish populations are able to replenish 
themselves and that the aquatic environment retains some balance between 
different species. Both the environmental and commercial aspects of New 
Zealand fisheries depend on this. 
28 8. Purpose - (1) The pUipOse of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries 
resources while ensuring sustainability. 
(2) In this Act -
"Ensuring sustainability" means -
(a) Maintaining L'1e potential of fisheries resources to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; 
and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of 
fishing on tJ1e aquatic emiromnent. 
"Utiiisation" means conserving, using, enl1ancing, and developing 
fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural well-being. 
29 Section 8 and s 9 Fisheries Act 1996. 
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Adequately dealing with the problem of open access fisheries is 
essential for maintaining sustainable fish stocks. One of the primaiy 
methods of ensuring sustainability in fisheries is to adequately define the 
rights, responsibilities and roles of each stakeholder (including the 
government), and to then effectively enforce those rights and obligations. 
Another connected objective of New Zealand fisheries is to obtain enough 
accurate information to adequately assess the condition of various fish 
stocks and the compliance of fishers around New Zealand. This enables 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the effectiveness of the sustainability 
policies. 
C Utilisation of Fisheries 
After sustainability, this is perhaps the most imp011ant objective for 
New Zealand fisheries. This is reflected in the way that the purpose section 
specifically provides for the utilisation of fisheries. The fishing indust1y 
plays a large part in our national economy. With the fourth largest 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world, New Zealand's fishing 
industry is a very important asset, both to those involved in the harvesting 
of fish and to the general public. 
The indust1y earns more than $1.2 billion in expo11s plus $125 
million in domestic sales per year. More than 10,000 people are employed 
by the industty and approximately 1800 vessels are used in commercial 
fishing. 30 
Commercial fishing is not the only utilis~tion of fish stocks in New 
Zealand. Recreational fishing is also ve1y imp011ant with more than 1 
million New Zealanders considered to be recreational fishers . 31 Maori 
customa1y fishers are also fundamental stakeholders in New Zealand's 
fisheries . The rights of these fishers to continue to access the nation's 
fisheries and exercise their rights to fish should also be a ve1y important 
objective of New Zealat1d fisheries management. 
30 Luxton, John "1998 Conference Address" (July 1998) 6:6 Seafood New Zealand, 28. 
31 New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council (Inc), Submission to Primary Production 
Seiect Conunittee on Fisheries Amendment Bili 1998, 1. 
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D Protection of the Aquatic Environment 
Although this paper focuses on commercial fish stocks under the 
QMS, it is important to remember that these do not exist in isolation. Each 
fish stock forms part of a complex ecosystem which makes our marine life 
so valuable. "Scientists world-wide now recognise New Zealand marine 
collections to be amongst the most comprehensive of their kind for any 
EEZ .... almost daily species new to New Zealand or to science in general 
are being discovered ... 11 32 
The protection of New Zealand's marine biodiversity is important 
for several reasons. First, it is important in its own right because the 
intrinsic value of the marine environment is something to be valued and 
preserved. Secondly, the medical and scientific uses of many of these 
marine species are at present undiscovered. These plants, animals and 
organisms could potentially be ve1y impo11ant in developing new 
technology or in curing disease. Thirdly, the manner in which the marine 
ecosystem interlinks means that the future viability of our commercial and 
recreational fishing industry depends on the delicate balance of the marine 
foodchain being maintained. 
E Conclusion 
Based around a central tenet of sustainability, the objectives of the 
Fisheries Act 1996 also provide for: the utilisation of fisheries resources by 
several sectors of society, the protection of the aquatic ecosystem and the 
gathering of information to monitor and achieve the objectives of the Act. 
VI DOES THE FISHERIES ACT 1996 ACHIEVE 
THESE OBJECTIVES? 
A Events Which Followed the Passing of the Fisheries 
Act 1996 
The Fishe1ies Act 1996 was passed after a lengthy process of 
review which began following the general election in 1990. The first effort 
32 O'Shea, Steve "The Deepsea Finned Octopoda of New Zealand" (October 1998) 6:9 
Seafood New Zealand 26, 28. 
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to review the legislation was made by a task force which reported back in 
1992. The recommendations of that task force were the subject of a draft 
bill in 1994, but this did not receive endorsement from the government. 
The cost recove1y portion of that bill was introduced later that year and a 
revised bill was presented by the Ministry in 1995. This version of the bill 
was passed in August 1996 to become the Fisheries Act 1996. The Act 
was to come into force over a period of time as implementation procedures 
were established. 
As the Bill was passed, the Ministty of Fisheries had just completed 
a split from the Ministry of Agriculture to become a separate government 
department. Under a new Minister of Fisheries, the Honourable John 
Luxton, the Ministry began to enquire into the costs which would be 
involved in implementing the legislation. Due to concern over the costs of 
implementing the Act, several discussion papers and cabinet papers were 
circulated voicing options for reform. 
In early 1998 an independent reviewer was appointed to "simplify 
the Act and determine how best to improve the efficiency of the 
commercial fisheries regime whilst building effective partnerships with 
commercial fishers and other stakeholders. 1133 The reviewer found that the 
Fisheries Act 1996 did not meet the government's fisheries management 
objectives. He stated that if the 1996 Act was to be implemented in its 
current form it was likely that the purpose of the Act would be 
undermined. 34 
The problems in the legislation fall into two broad categories. 35 
The first of these concerns the "framework" problems with the 
organisation and administration New Zealand fisheries management. These 
include decision making processes and transparency of decision making. 
The second group of problems relates to the "operational" provisions of the 
Act including the cost recove1y regime and fisher compliance with the Act. 
33 Tony Hartevelt, Fishing for the Future: Review of the Fisheries Act 1996 - Rep:irt of 
the Independent Reviewer of the Fishereis Act to the Minister of Food, Fibre, 
Biosecurity and Border Control (Wellington, September 1998) 17. 
34 Tony Hartevelt above n 33, 18. 
35 Tony Hartevelt above n 33, 18. 
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B The "Framework" Problems Present in the Fisheries 
Act 1996 
1 The Problem of Piecemeal Legislation 
The Fisheries Act 1996 was drafted with the aim of simplifying the 
law relating to fisheries. It has not done this. Instead, it has contributed to 
a body of legislation which is becoming increasingly convoluted and 
confusing. The 1996 Act was intended to replace the Fisheries Act 1983 
and its many amendments. However, many provisions of the 1996 Act are 
not yet in force. Some of these provisions will be repealed without ever 
being used. In general, the review and substantial amendment of 
legislation, within a short period of it being passed indicates that the 
practicalities of the content were not given detailed thought. 
The piecemeal nature of the legislation coupled with the frequency 
of amendments and the complexity of the subject matter, means that very 
few people without a legal background have a thorough understanding of 
the law relating to New Zealand fisheries. As many of the people affected 
by fisheries legislation; for example, fishermen, fish retailers, skippers and 
boat owners, do not have legal experience, it is very difficult for them to 
know their exact legal obligations. 
Complex legislation tends to alienate those affected by it. 
Legislation which takes long periods of time to understand, removes 
compliance incentives. This in turn can affect the likelihood of fisheries 
management objectives being achieved. 
Complex and frequently updated legislation is also hard to annotate. 
It runs the risk of being hard to access in the correct form. This type of 
legislation also results in increased costs for the Ministry involved, in terms 
of producing brochures to explain the legislation, and fielding enquires 
regarding individual's rights and obligations. 
It is interesting to note that the continuation of piecemeal fisheries 
legislation comes at a time when the government is tiying to abandon its 
formerly confrontational relationship with fisheries stakeholders in favour 
of a more co-operative approach. The Fisheries Act 1996 does nothing to 
help achieve this objective. It merely serves to further alienate those 
interested in New Zealand fisheries. 
2 Vague dejinifion of "susfainable managemenf of fisheries 
resources"36 
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Section 8 of the Fisheries Act sets out a general definition of the 
purpose of the Act. However, this definition is not given a concrete 
footing in government policy papers or reports of TAC decisions. This 
lack of clarity relates especially to the provisions requiring the mitigation, 
avoidance or remedying of any adverse effects to the envirnnrnent. Does 
this provision include all effects of fishing? Are very minute effects 
eliminated? Must attempts be made to avoid or remedy the effect before 
exercising the mitigation option? 
A comparison can be made here with the similar purpose provision 
of sustainability under the Resource Management Act 1991.37 In that case, 
there has been considerable academic discourse on the meaning and 
implementation of the purpose provision. 38 The interpretation to be given 
to the section has also been considered in many decisions of the Planning 
Tribunal and the Environment Court. 39 The same is not true of the purpose 
of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
Although a general purpose statement is acceptable, and indeed is 
desirable in the Act itself, it is necessa1y to elaborate on this to "ensure that 
stakeholders share a common understanding of the outcomes sought by 
government for fisheries management" . 40 
3 Lack of transparency in decision making 
This especia11y concerns TAC and T ACC decisions made by the 
Minister, but also applies more generally to other sustainability decisions. 
Decisions regarding an increase or reduction in TAC or T ACC are usually 
accompanied by a small explanation of stock levels justifying the decision. 
36 Tony Hartevelt above n 33, 19. 
3 7 Part II Resource Management Act 1991 . 
38 For example, Simon Upton "Purpose and Principle in the Resource Management 
Act" (1995) 3 Waikato LR i995, i 7. 
39 For example, .Marlborough Ridge Ltd v .Marlborough District Council [1997] 
NZR.i"\1A 25 and NZ Rail v Marlborough District Council [1994] N.zruv--iA. 70. 
40 Tony Hartevelt above n 33, 19. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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According to the Fisheries Act 1996 there are various 
considerations that the Minister must take into account before making 
sustainability and utilisation decisions. These include the maintenance of 
dependent or associated species at a level which ensures long-term 
viability, the maintenance of biological diversity, the protection of 
significant habitats and the certainty or adequacy of the scientific 
information available.41 The Minister must also have regard to regional 
plans and policy statements, and management strategies made under the 
Conservation Act 1987.42 Consultation with interested groups is also 
required under the Act43 and usually takes place in the six months prior to 
the decision being made. 
If the !vfinister wrote a report as pa1t of his decision, detailing the 
considerations he has taken into account, the weight he has put on each 
consideration and the reasons for this decision, the process of making TAC 
and TACC decisions would seem less arbitrary. This could be similar, 
although in a less detailed manner, to the repo1ts made by District Councils 
regarding plans, plan changes and resource consents under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 . The reasons behind ministerial decision making 
would be clearer and this would lead to increased accountability for the 
decisions by the Minister. At present no provision requiiing such repotts is 
included in the Fisheries Act 1996. 
4 Lack of rights definition 
Another major problem with the Fisheries Act 1996 is that it fails to 
clearly define the rights and obligations of each stakeholder. For those 
involved in the commercial fishing industry this means that their livelihood 
is less secure. Without the knowledge that legislation will not be 
drastically changed to reduce the value of their assets44, industry 
stakeholders are more reluctant to invest in research and sustainability 
41 Section 8, s9 and slO Fisheries Act 1996. 
42 Section 11 Fisheries Act 1996. 
43 Section 12 Fisheries Act 1996. 
44 One example where this has already happened was the change from fixed ITQs to 
percentage based ITQs. This made quota holders subject to L'le .fluctuations of TAC 
ievels. These are more iikely to decrease than increase. These changes were made in 
1990 without compensation for quota holders. 
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measures. They are also less likely to work with the government in a 
consultative manner over future fisheries developments. 
Despite the lack of certainty concerning the rights and obligations 
of commercial fishers, the Fisheries Act 1996 retains a commercial focus. 
Other interest groups such as recreational fishers, marine scientists, those 
exercising Maori customary fishing rights and conservationists are even less 
certain of their rights and obligations under the Act. For example, what 
right does a conservation group have to request research into sustainability 
measures? How fully are recreational fishers allowed to participate in 
consultation processes? 
The rights and responsibilities of the government under the Act are 
also poorly defined. The extent to which the government can interfere in 
the running of the commercial fishing industry is unclear. The extent to 
which the government can modify the rights of other parties without 
compensation is also unclear. 
Defining the rights of the different interest groups involved with 
New Zealand fisheries management paves the way for development and 
reform to be undertaken on a consensual basis as opposed to the 
confrontational, adversary approach which is cutTently taken. 
5 Lack of Scientific Information 
The provision of scientific information is very imp01tant in 
achieving the goals of New Zealand fisheries management, especially with 
regard to the sustainability provisions. The Fisheries Act 1996 includes 
provisions which state that, in the absence of adequate scientific 
information, a precautionary approach to decision making should be taken, 
but the Act neglects to place an obligation on the government to collect as 
much information as possible on various species. 
The government is rest1icted by numerous other demands on a fixed 
pool of resources, but it must be acknowledged that New Zealand fisheries 
management cannot move forward without further research regarding 
fishstocks, biodiversity and the influence of fishing on the environment. 
The maintenance of current data is also imp01tant to ensure that changes in 
populations or activity are noted. 
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C The "Operational" Problems Present in the Fisheries 
Act 1996 
These problems relate to the practical running of the QMS. There 
is some overlap between the "framework" and the "operational'' provisions, 
but these are in general more practically based. 
1 Cost Recovery System Principles 
The Cost Recove1y system was introduced in 1994 and is based on 
a principle of "cost avoidance" . This means that all costs which would be 
"avoided" were it not for the commercial fishing industry, are recoverable. 
This principle neglects to attribute costs to those who actually incur 
them and instead levies these off the industry as a whole. This results in 
inequities of cost recove1y payments, under which some fishers, company 
owners and boat owners pay a cost recovery levy which is disproportionate 
to the benefit they receive. 
The cost recovery scheme has always been an issue of contention 
between the Crown and the commercial fishing industry. This is in part 
because of the complex methods of allocating and appo11ioning the costs. 
"Presently, cost recovery is one of the main drivers of the Ministry's 
worldoad, rather than being a mechanism to recover costs. 1145 
Industry representatives have also argued that the cost recove1y 
scheme is overly expensive and is inefficient because the Crown has no 
incentive to contract for competitiveiy priced services. 46 Many of the 
services for which costs are recovered are provided directly by the Crown. 
The industry argues that, in this capacity, the Crown is a monopoly 
provider and that this situation results in inefficient and ineffective 
management of fisheries services. 
2 Quota Busting 
This is one of a number of compliance problems which continue to 
occur under the Fisheries Act 1996. A lack of compliance with the 
45 Tony Hartevelt above n 33, 59. 
46 Report of the Joint Working Group to Develop Fisheries Cost Recovery Rules 
(unpubiished, Wellington, 22 July 1999) [Fisheries Cost Recoveryl-
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fundamental rules of the QMS endangers the sustainability of fishstocks 
and risks contamination of data collected by researchers assessing fish 
populations. 
Quota busting occurs when fishers catch more fish than are 
allocated to them under their ITQ. The Fisheries Act 1996, provides that 
fishers have to seil their fish to registered suppliers and both parties must 
keep records of the fish they sell or receive. However, it is tempting for 
fishers, especially smaller quota holders, to quota bust because the chances 
of getting caught are very small. 
The vast size of the New Zealand EEZ and the number of fishers 
compared to the physical and monetary monitoring resources, makes 
effective monitoring and enforcement extremely difficult. To effectively 
monitor New Zealand's entire EEZ would not be economically justifiable. 
For fishers wanting to break the law by quota busting the benefits often 
seem to out weigh the costs. 
3 The By-catch Problem 
The by-catch problem is also a feature of the current QMS in New 
Zealand. The nature of many fishing areas means that it is difficult to 
target one species of fish without catching sizeable quantities of other fish. 
However, many fishers do not have the quota to cover these other fish 
catches. This is in part due to the way in which fisheries quotas were 
allocated when new species were introduced to the QMS. 
The quota allocation was based on previous catch histories and did 
not include fish stocks which had not been discovered or were not 
commercially exploited at the time. Fishers with very small quota 
allocations were also encouraged to sell them to the government when 
QMS was introduced. 
The by-catch problem has been dealt with by the Fisheries Act 1996 
through the implementation of a by-catch trade off regime. Under this 
system, fishers who do not have quota for all of the by-catch they harvest, 
are able to trade the by-catch for some of their quota. The aim of this 
scheme is to encourage fishers to land the fish instead of dumping them, 
but at the same time to discourage deliberate overfishing. However, the 
by-catch trade off often results in the catch figures for common by-catch 
species far exceeding their TAC. This endangers the future sustainability 
of the species. 
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4 High Grading 
This involves the dumping of fish which are not of marketable 
quality or size because they take up quota space. This occurs patticularly 
in high value fish stocks such as snapper. The practise threatens the 
sustainability of the species because more stock is caught than is actually 
recorded. This practice also damages the integrity of catch data which is 
used to establish sustainability measures. 
Fishers argue that it is economically ineffective to land and process 
fish that are unable to be used because they do not meet their quality 
criteria. 4 7 
5 Localised Race for Fish 
This is a conunon feature of most QMS systems. The 'race for fish' 
which occurred under open access regimes is transferred into a race to get 
the most fish for the least effort. This means that areas where fishstocks 
are abundant, high quality and well established, will be quickly depleted 
because fishers are able to catch more high quality fish for less effort. 
This practice catTies serious consequences. As a result of the 
depletion of fish stocks in certain areas, there are consequential effects on 
the surrounding ecosystems, dependent species and the ability of stocks to 
redevelop in that area. There is also additional damage caused by a 
multitude of fishing boats operating in the area. 
D Conclusion: Does the Fisheries Act Achieve its 
Objectives? 
The Fisheries Act 1996 has not achieved the objectives set out in 
sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. The Act remains cluttered and clumsy. 
Some of its provisions pose a danger to the main purpose of the Act -
sustainable utilisation. The Act fails to define the rights and obligations of 
parties involved in New Zealand fisheries management, and it does not 
provide for transparent and accountable government decision making. 
However, many of the problems associated with the Fisheries Act 
1996 do not nel:essarily stem from the combination of tragedy responses 
4 7 Sealord Group Limited, Submission to the Primary Production Select Committee on 
the Fisheries Amendn1ent Bill 1998, 19. 
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which have been used in New Zealand to manage fisheries. The cost 
recovery regime established mixture between government regulation and 
private prope1iy rights Compliance problems are a common feature of the 
government regulation response, but these would occur to a certain extent 
WJth the use of any combination of the responses. 
The amendment to the Fisheries Act 1996 seeks to change the 
combination under which New Zealand fisheries are managed. Presently 
under the 1996 Act, fisheries are largely managed through private property 
rights combined with government regulation. The amount of control from 
the stakeholders is minimal, and is mostly limited to consultation on 
matters such as TAC and T ACC setting, cost recovery issues and by-catch 
prov1s1ons. 
E Review and Reform of the Fisheries Act 1996 
In 1998 an independent review of New Zealand fisheries 
management was originally contemplated due to the costs of implementing 
the Fisheries Act 1996, however, following internal department reviews, 
discussion papers and cabinet reports it was found that amendments to the 
Fisheries Act 1996 would need to be more far-reaching. 
FolloWJng the presentation of the independent review in September 
1998, an amending bill was drafted incorporating most of the reviewer's 
recommendations. It was proposed to make changes in several stages, 
addressing the definition of the rights of the parties involved, cost recove1y 
and partial devolution in the 1998 Bill, and then continuing to discuss plans 
for co-management and recreational fishe1ies at a later stage. 
This move represents a continuation of the creation of piecemeal 
legislation which can only add complexity to a part of the law which seems 
to be in a constant state of reform. The way in which ref01m matters were 
separated has also attracted criticism from environmental groups who 
believe that the partial devolution to fall within the Fisheries Amendment 
Bill 1998, effectively pre-empts the consultation procedures which will take 
place to discuss co-management.48 
The Fisheries Amendment Biil 1998 was introduced to the House 
of Representatives in December 1998, and was referred to the Primary 
Production Select Committee on 15 December 1998. The Bill was 
48 Interviewee 4. 
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amended in Select Committee and was passed through the House under 
urgency on 4 September 1999. 
Vli THE FiSHERIES AlYIE1VD1YIE!--IT ACT 1999 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 seeks to change the balance 
upon which New Zealand fisheries are presently operated. This change 
involves the reduction of the role that the government plays and an increase 
in the role of industry and other stakeholders. The change leans more 
towards a combination of private property rights and internal control of 
those rights by stakeholders. 
The Bill makes several significant changes to the Fisheries Act 
1996. This section of the paper identifies those changes and looks at 
whether they improve the quality of the regime in terms of it achieving its 
objectives, or whether they simply bring new problems to the legislation. 
A The Changes Incorporated in the Act 
This section of the paper looks at three major changes which have 
been made under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999. The changes are 
then analysed to find whether they succeed in solving any of the current 
problems with the Fishe1ies Act 1996, or whether they create new 
problems in their own right. These changes are: 
(a) Devolution of certain functions of the Ministry of Fisheries 
CEO to the industry;49 
(b) The provisions allowing the setting of an alternative T ACC to 
permit fishing below BMsY;50 
( c) The provisions allowing for the development of fisheries 
plans.51 
49 Part 15A Fisheries Act 1996. 
50 Section 14A to 14C Fisheries Act 1999. 
51 Section 11 A Fisheries Act 1999. 
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B Devolution of Functions to Approved Service Delivery 
Associations 
The devolution of fisheries services, pa11icularly research services, 
has been one of the most contentious issues surrounding New Zealand 
fisheries management. The idea is controversial for many reasons. 
1 Reasons for Concern Over Devolution 
First, there is a concern that allowing the users of a resource to 
control themselves puts the sustainability of New Zealand fisheries at risk. 
This concern is connected to the assumption that commercial fishers are 
primarily interested in the economic gains to be achieved from fishing, 
rather than in the conservation of fishstocks and sustainable management. 
Secondly, there is a concern that there will be a loss of 
accountability if services are devolved. At present the Minister of Fisheries 
is an elected Member of Parliament who is accountable to the general 
public for his actions. The same cannot be said of the fishing industry. It is 
thought that if research services are devolved to the industry, then the 
integrity of the databases could be compromised and research could 
become increasingly client driven 
Thirdly, there is a concern that New Zealand fisheries will be 
completely dominated by the commercial industry leaving no room for 
other interested pa11ies such as scientists, conservationists, recreational 
fishers and Maori fishers to have their say in management decisions. 
2 Devolution Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 - What Does 
It Involve? 
Part 15A of the Fishe1ies Act contains the provisions which relate 
to devolution. The Act provides that any functions, duties or powers of 
the Chief Executive which are either: 
(a) exclusively associated with the administration of quota; or 
(b) p1imaiily associated with the administration of conunercial 
fisheries, 
may be transfeITed to an approved service delivery organisation. 
The powers ~~ to be \\~~~ned by order-in-council at the 
discretion of the Mini~~~\.. of ~\~~es, in consultation with the Minister 
responsible for the adm.iru'st1'ation of the Environment Act 1986. The 
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definition of "specified functions, duties and powers" expressly provides 
that none of the functions, duties or powers of the Minister are to be 
devolved. This also applies to the powers conferred on fishery officers, 
honorary fishery officers and examiners. 
An "approved service delive1y organisation" (ASDO) must be an 
incorporated company made up of quota owners. It must be able to ensure 
that the functions devolved, will be carried out to acceptable standards. 
Prior to the transfer of any functions under Part 1 SA, the Minister must be 
satisfied that standards and specifications have been issued in relation to the 
specified duties, functions or powers. The Minister may request a bond 
from the ASDO which is sufficient to cover the transfer costs of the 
Crown. 
The ASDO is responsible to the Minster for the delivery of the 
services devolved. They may perfom1 those services either through their 
own employees or by entering into a contract with another individual, 
agency or body. The Minster can terminate the transfer of power by giving 
notice to the ASDO. Notice can only be given if the ASDO has failed to 
comply with the standards and specifications, failed to comply with 
directions, failed to increase the bond if requested to, or if there is a serious 
problem with the organisation. 
3 Critique of the Devolution Provision 
The argument in favour of devolution is that the fishing industty has 
reached a point where the agencies suitable to administer fisheries 
management have been established by the industry. The industry
52 and the 
Ministry ofFisheries53 are of the opinion that many of the transaction costs 
associated with the cost recove1y regime could be avoided if the industty 
either, provided certain services itself, or employed others to provide the 
services on their behalf 
The industty also argues that it is more likely to comply with 
management initiatives which it has had a say in developing. Industry 
52 New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC), Submission to Primary Production 
Select Committee on Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 (22 February 1999) 17 [SeaFIC]. 
53 Fisheries Cost Recovery above n 47, 2. 
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members believe that fisheries management will be enhanced through 
industry management. 54 
However, there are also disadvantages to the devolution of fisheries 
services under the provisions of the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999. 
Originally the devolution provisions in the Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 
allowed for the possible devolution of the functions of both the Chief 
Executive and the Minister. 55 This was opposed by conservation groups 
and marine scientists. 56 The scope of the devolution under the Fisheries 
Amendment Act 1999 has been reduced to the functions of the Chief 
Executive, but the provisions themselves remain very vague. 
The functions of the Chief Executive which may be devolved have 
not been named in the Act. The functions of the chief Executive were to 
be included in a Schedule to the Act, but this provision was removed in the 
Seiect Committee stage. 57 It is specified that the functions may be 
statutory or non-statutory. This which leaves the scope very wide for 
devolution. The provisions in Pait 15A are narrowed a little by the 
restrictions on the type of functions to be devolved, but the wording 
"[p ]rimatily associated with the administration of commercial 
fisheries 1158lends itself to wide interpretation. 
The Part 15A amendments stipulates that appropriate specifications 
must be in place before any function can be devolved. The setting of these 
specifications and standards involves a consideration of the purpose section 
and the environmental and information principles of the Fishe1ies Act 1996. 
The Ministry will also be responsible for monitoring and auditing any 
devolved service delivery to ensure that these specifications are met. The 
54 SeaFlC above n 53, 17. 
55 Environmental and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand, Submission to 
Primary Production Select Committe on Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 (21 February 
1999) 10 [ECO Submission]. 
56 ECO Submission above n56 and New Zealand Marine Science Society, Submission 
to Primary Production Select Committee onFisheries Amendment Bill 1999 (20 
February 1999). 
57 Interviewee 2. 
58 Section 296A Fisheries Act 1996. 
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cost for this auditing and monitoring will largely be met by the industry 
under the cost recovery scheme. 59 
The risk with this system is that the costs of accurately and 
effectively auditing and monitoring the ASDO could make the devolved 
service more expensive than the government provided service. As one of 
the aims of devolution is to reduce the costs to the industry, a situation in 
which industry expenditure is increased could lead to the industry handing 
the functions back to the Minister for a return to government 
administration. 
Pa11 15A of the Act specifies that an ASDO must be made up of 
quota holders. This effectively prevents other interested groups from 
taking pai1 in devolution and having a hand in fisheries management. The 
Select Committee was of the opinion that this was appropriate considering 
the commercial rights holders had the greatest interest in the efficient and 
effective delivery of such services.60 This is correct to an extent, but it can 
also be argued that other groups such as environmentalists have the 
greatest interest in seeing that the purpose of the Act (sustainable 
utilisation) is achieved. 
At this time non-commercial organisations do not commonly have 
the resources or the management structure to provide many of the services 
which may be devolved. A consultation process regai·ding the making of 
standards and specifications could be a useful comprorn.ise, giving other 
interest groups some input while allowing the quota holders to mange the 
services within those specifications. 
Under Part 15A of the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999, fisheries 
research is not likely to be devolved, however section 294 of the parent 
Act enables the Ministry of Fisheries to allow research services to be 
"directly purchased" by the industry. 6
1 There is little difference between 
devolution and direct purchase. In the case of direct purchase the Ministry 
is accountable for ensuring that the se1vice is delivered, as opposed to 
accountability resting with the ASDO under devolution. 62 The 
59 Interviewees 2 and 3. 
60 Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998, no 258-2, x.i (Expanatory note). 
61 Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998, no 258-2 , xi (Explanatory note). 
62 Ministry of Fisheries, Departmental Report on Fisheries .Amendment Bill and 
Supplementary Order Paper No 164, 1 [Departmental Reponl . 
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Departmental Report on the Fisheries Amendment Bill and Supplementary 
Order Paper No 164 indicates that direct purchase will be used for research 
services. 
The proposed devolution of research raises concerns that research 
will become client driven. This would mean that organisations contracted 
to provide the research would be reluctant to provide findings which could 
result in T ACC lowering for fear of not having their contracts renewed the 
following year. Using direct purchase to provide research services could 
also result in some research being delayed or curtailed because the findings 
are likely to be detrimental to the industry. 
C Fishing Below BMSY 
The MSY or the Maximum Sustainable Yield is the greatest yield 
that can be achieved over time, while maintaining the stocks productive 
capacity, having regard to population dynamics and environmental factors 
influencing stock. The Fisheries Act 1996 provided that the Minister was 
to set the TAC at a level which would maintain MSY or work towards 
achieving MSY. 63 
1 The ''Fishing Below BMsr "Provision 
Sections 14A to 14C of the Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 provide 
for an "Alternative Total Allowable Catch" (ATAC) to be set for some by-
catch stocks. This AT AC wili be set at a level below BMsY, but at a level 
high enough to ensure the long-term viability of the fishstock. The aim of 
this change is to enable a higher TAC to be set so that fishers in that area 
can catch a sufficient quantity of their target fish. 
The Act provides that an ATAC will not be set unless it has the 
approval of at least 95% of quota holders. The Wnnistry believes that the 
provision will reduce dumping of excess by-catch stock which are no 
longer able to be traded for quota under the by-catch trade off 
63 Section 13 Fisheries Act 1999. 
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provisions.64 In tum this will increase the accuracy of the information 
obtained on stock levels by way of increased reporting. 
Before setting the ATAC the Iv1inister must be satisfied that the 
stock is a by-catch species and not a target species, that the total benefits 
of the ATAC outweigh the costs, that there will not be any detrimental 
effects to non-commercial interests, that the stock will be maintained at a 
level which ensures long-term viability and that the purpose of the Fisheries 
Act 1996 would be better achieved by setting an AT AC. 
2 Critique of Fishing Below BMsY 
The explanatory note to the Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 
explains that the policy of ATACs was introduced in order to allow fishers 
to take larger quantities of their target stocks. Without this mechanism it is 
argued that the TACs of some by-catch stocks will often be breached. This 
could result in two situations. First, it could result in the closure of some 
target fisheries and secondly, in the face of probable closure fishers would 
be more likely to dump by-catch, damaging the integrity of population 
databases and creating sustainability risks. 
Fishing certain by-catch species below BMsY may have several 
economic and reporting advantages, but there are also serious 
disadvantages associated with the practices. Minist1y officials have 
commented that, due to the strict criteria that must be achieved to the 
satisfaction of the Minister before an ATAC can be introduced,65the 
provision is unlikely to be exercised often. 66 However, there is pressure 
from the indust1y to make the use of below BMsY fishing applicable a wider 
range of situations. 67 
The primary disadvantage of setting ATACs is that it does not place 
enough emphasis on the role of each fish species within the marine 
ecosystem. "Species may have important ecological functions. If you 
reduce them significantly and depress populations substantially, these 
64 Departmental Report above n 62, 1. 
65 Especially the provisions in sl4A (5) (e) which relate to the BMsY level better 
achieving the purpose of the Act. 
66 Interviewee 3. 
67 Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 No258-2, vi (Explanatory note) . 
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ecological functions may cease, with consequential adverse effects 
occurring through the ecosystem ... 1168 The Ministry does not yet have 
enough information on the functions of marine ecosystems to be able to 
confidently state that they will not be irreversibly affected by AT A Cs. 69 
This lack of information also affects the certainty that the stock 
levels will not be driven so low as to result in the collapse of the stock in 
that area. The explanatory note of the Fisheries Amendment Bill 
acknowledges a low risk of collapse. Are economic factors important 
enough under the purpose provisions of the Act to allow even a "low" risk 
of collapse? 
The purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 is to provide for the 
utilisation of fisheries while ensuring sustainability. Ensuring sustainability 
includes avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on 
the aquatic environment. Utilisation includes conserving, using, enhancing 
and developing resources to enable people to provide for their social, 
economic and cultural well-being. The setting of AT ACs allows a select 
group of people to provide for their economic and social well-being while 
increasing the adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment. 
Fishing stocks below BMsY goes against the purpose of the Fisheries Act 
1996. 
D Tile Development of Fisheries Plans 
1 How do Fisheries Plans Work? 
Section 1 lA of the Fisheries Act 1996 makes provision for the 
implementation of fisheries plans. This is one of the only changes which 
has, prima facie, received support from most interest groups. Differences 
among submitters tended to focus on the contents of the plans rather than 
the plans themselves. 
Fishe1ies plans may include management objectives to support the 
purpose of the Act, strategies to achieve those objectives, performance 
criteria, conservation or fishe1ies se1vices or contingency se1vices. 
Therefore, plans can include recommendations for the settings of T ACs 
and T ACCs, mles to manage interaction between different sectors and 
68 ECO Submission above n 57, 5. 
69 Departmental Report above n 63, 2. 
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criteria to measure the achievement of objectives. Plans can be made for 
one or more fish stocks, fishing years or fishing areas, or a combination of 
these 7° . 
Plans are to be given to the Minister for approval. Once approved 
the Minister must take the plans into account before setting or varying any 
sustainability measure, or before making any decision or recommendation 
under the Fisheries Act 1996. This means that, although plans are not 
binding on the Minister, they will carry some weight when decisions are 
being made. 
2 Critique of Fisheries Plans 
In general, the provision for fisheries plans are a good idea. They 
can help to clearly set out the objectives of New Zealand fisheries 
management and can define the roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders. They can also provide a forum within which the voices of all 
interest groups can be heard. The potential of fisheries plans is great, 
however, it is debatable whether they will live up to that potential. 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 neglects to mention who will 
draft the fisheries plans, and what sort of consultation provisions the draft 
plans will be subject to. The Ministry of Fisheries has not allocated money 
for the formulation of fisheries plans so it is likely that these plans will be 
drafted by the industry. 7l If the plans are made by the industry two 
situations may occur. 
First, the plans may be made by the indust1y after effo11s have been 
made to consult all interested parties and take account of their views. 
Considering the polarisation of opinion which has characterised most 
fisheries issues it is unlikely that the stakeholders will reach a consensus on 
any matters of significance. This would result in plans which, although 
weighty, would not contain guidelines and information on key areas of 
fisheries management. 
Secondly, the industly could make fisheries plans which address the 
fundamental management issues, but which have not been made m 
c'o1'lsultation with other stakeholders. These plans would hold limited 
70 Section I IA Fisheries Act 1996. 
71 Interviewees 2 and 3. 
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weight with the Minister when decisions were made and would effectively 
serve as an additional indust1y lobbying tool. 
The P1ima1y Production Select Committee considers that "it is 
unnecessary to limit the source of proposals for fisheries plans by requiring 
all plans to be developed by the Government in consultation with 
stakeholders. "72However, a system similar to that undertaken by District 
Councils when producing distiict plans would ensure that all parties were 
consulted, and their views were taken into account by an unbiased, 
distanced decision maker. Making plans along these guidelines would be a 
more costly exercise, but it would result in plans which fairly reflected the 
opinion of all parties interested in New Zealand fisheries management. 
These plans would carry considerable weight when the Minister made 
decisions. Such plans could mark a big step forward for the clarity, 
transparency and accountability of New Zealand fisheries management. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 marks a fundamental shift in 
New Zealand fisheries management. The New Zealand approach to 
fisheries management is made up of a combination of the three responses to 
Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons'. It operates primarily as a government 
regulated private property regime with consultation amongst interested 
parties. However, the latest set of arnmedments provides for a shift in the 
dynamics of this combination. The Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 puts 
mechanisms in place to transfer many of the government's fisheries 
management obligations onto the industry. This will be a continuing 
process with discussion and consultation regarding co-management to take 
place early in the year 2000. 73 The amended system of New Zealand 
fisheries management can now be diagrarnmed as follows: 
Privat Property Goverm11ent egulation 
72 Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 No258-2, iii (Explanatory note) . 
73 Fisheries Amendment Bill 1998 No258-2, ii (Explanatory note). 
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This paper set out to examine the theoretical responses to Hardin's 
'Tragedy of the Commons' in the practical context of New Zealand fisheries 
management. After reaching the conclusion that none of Hardin's three .. 
responses of privatisation, government control or internal control could 
work effectively on their own in a pure fonn, the paper proceeded on the 
assumption that, to effectively deal with the problem posed by the 'tragedy 
of the commons', a combination of all three responses was needed. 
New Zealand provides an interesting example of the practical 
effects of the 'tragedy' problem because the fishing industty is important to 
the economy and because the size of New Zealand's EEZ is 
disproportionate to the population and moneta1y resources of the countiy. 
New Zealand's fisheries management is also going through a period of 
change which aids in providing useful comparisons. 
The second pa11 of this paper looked at the practical 
implementation of a combination of 'tragedy' solutions. The paper studied 
not only whether the combination solves the 'Tragedy of the Commons', 
but also whether it achieves wider objectives of sustainable utilisation. 
A Does New Zealand's Fisheries Management System 
Adequately Deal With the Tragedy of the Commons? 
New Zealand deals with the tragedy of the commons by allocating a 
private property right to fishers . This system works better than a licence or 
permit system because it, not only restricts the number of people able to 
use the fishery in a conunercial manner, but also restricts the tonnage and 
the species of fish which they are able to catch. A personal property right 
gives fishers an asset which can appreciate or depreciate in value depending 
on their conduct. It provides an economic incentive, backed up by civil and 
criminal penalties, to fish sustainably. 
The QMS in New Zealand is managed through government 
regulation which ensures that the limits prescribed by the private property 
rights are complied with. This provides the enforcement behind the 
'tragedy' solution and prevents an open access regime from redeveloping. 
Once the changes to New Zealand fishe1ies management have taken 
place, the limits on access to the commons and the amount of fish able to 
be taken from the commons will remain. However, the industty may have 
the power, through client driven research and persuasively presented 
fisheries plans, to change the limits of extraction from the commons. This 
would result in an increased risk to the sustainability of fish.stocks. The key 
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to maintaining sustainability under industry control is the cohesiveness of 
the group. 
If the positive utility to a single fisher of taking one more fish from 
the commons is + 1 and the negative utility of the effect on the commons to 
that single fisher is only a fraction of -1, he or she will take the fish. 
However, if the group views the activities of one being the activities of the 
group as a whole then the positive utility of that one fisher taking another 
fish is lowered and the negative utility of the effect on the commons rises. 
Theoretically, this could lead to voluntary compliance amongst fishers with 
the catch limits set. 
Both the New Zealand system as it stands and the new combination 
of responses to the 'tragedy of the commons' are able to adequately solve 
the problems of open access. However, this does not necessarily guarantee 
sustainability. 
B Does New Zealand's Fisheries Management System 
Achieve its Objectives? 
The main objective of New Zealand fisheries is "sustainable 
utilisation" . When asking the question, "has New Zealand achieved 
sustainable utilisation of fisheries?", the real answer is that we do not 
know. The nature of the fisheries resource means that it is very hard to 
assess the exact populations of our fishstocks and compare them to 
populations in previous years on the basis of size, number and quality. The 
long-term effects of fishing on the marine ecosystem is also an area about 
which little is conclusively known. 
Much of the cun-ent knowledge about New Zealand fish 
populations is based upon the catch and effort statistics of commercial 
fishers . An effort must be made to ensure that these figures are as accurate 
as possible. This means dealing effectively with the problem of by-catch, 
high grading, data fouling and over fishing. The industry is likely to 
present an optimistic picture of fish numbers because this infonnation 
directly reflects the setting of the TAC which directly affects the income of 
its members. 
To develop a truly sustainable fishery it is necessary to abandon the 
adversaiy approach which has chai·acterised New Zealand fisheries to date. 
However, a co-operative approach does not equal a closed club which has 
only government and indust1y as members. Environmentalists, scientists, 
and recreational and Maori fishers also have a lot to offer the industry in 
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terms of experience and information. The rights and obiigations of these 
patties must be clearly laid out. The current amendments to the Fisheries 
Act 1996 go some way to achieving this, however improvement is needed 
in defining the roles of non-commercial stakeholders. 
C Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper argues that the best way to sustainably 
mange fisheries in New Zealand is on a more localised level through 
detailed fisheries plans which have been developed in consultation with all 
parties involved. This would inevitably include contributions from the 
industry, but would also allow scientists, environmentalists, recreational 
and Maori fishers to have important input. 
The factors which influence fisheries change around New Zealand 
depending on the aquatic life which exists in the area, the impo1iance of the 
biodiversity, the species which dominate the area, the depth of the water 
and numerous other factors. Controlling this on a national basis does not 
provide enough attention to detail, or allow for localised knowledge. The 
fisheries plans would still have to be administered and drafted by 
government officials to ensure that they represent an accurate picture of the 
area's :fisheries, but this could be done either on a local government level. 
It is important to remember that hmnan nature and the nature of 
fisheries resources precludes a perfect system. There will always be 
unce1tainty as to the exact number of fish there are in cetiain areas, and the 
extent to which the marine ecosystem has been altered by fishing. There 
will always be people who will overfish, misreport data or dump fish in the 
ocean. 
By accepting that there is a need for more information about 
:fisheries, by accepting that there are many interest groups in fisheries which 
lie outside the commercial sphere, and by accepting that the concept of 
sustainability represents the bottomline of New Zealand fisheries 
management upon which all other interests depend, New Zealand can 
develop a co-operative, paiticipato1y :fisheries regime which ensures the 
sustainability of our fish stocks and the ecosystem which surrounds them. 
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